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ARTICLE 9 NORTH OF 490: THE CANADIAN
PPS ACTS AND THE QUEBEC CIVIL CODE
Ronald C. C. Cuming*
I. INTRODUCTION
The international influence of Article 9 of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code (Article 9) has been nowhere more significant than in
Canada. There are several unique and important features of
Canadian developments in this respect that may have relevance for
other nations. One of these features is that Canadian law reformers
in common-law provinces of Canada were able to take Article 9 as a
starting point and build into it refinements and other features that
reflect Canadian legal traditions and public policies. Another is that
the Canadian Personal Property Security Acts (PPSAs), unlike their
counterparts in the United States, function in the context of modem,
remote-access computerized registry systems. Article 9 also provided
inspiration for modernization of secured financing law in the
Canadian province of Quebec, a civil-law system with a strong French
heritage. While, of course, it is much more difficult to find direct
terminological and structural parallels between Article 9 and the new
Quebec Civil Code (Civil Code) than it is between Article 9 and the
PPSAs of the other provinces, some of the more important features
of Article 9's conceptual infrastructure can be found in the Civil
Code.
* Professor Cuming teaches commercial law at the University of Saskatchewan,
Saskatoon, Canada. He was the principal advisor to the governments of Alberta, British
Columbia, and Saskatchewan in the design and implementation of Personal Property
Security Acts in those provinces (1986-1993). He served as a member of the advisory
board for the European Bank on Reconstruction and Development project to develop a
Model Law on Secured Transactions. He is currently a consultant to the International
Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDRO1T) on a Convention on Security
Interests in Mobile Equipment and consultant to the Private Sector Development
Department of the World Bank, Washington, D.C. He is the director of the Secured
Financing Project, National Law Center for Inter-American Free Trade, Tucson, Arizona.
Professor Cuming is the coauthor of books on Canadian personal property security law
and is the author of numerous chapters and articles on commercial law.
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In this Essay the Author has provided a brief overview of a
PPSA and associated registry system, noting some of the most
important differences between the Canadian legislation and Article 9.
In addition, this Essay contains a brief description of the key secured
financing provisions of the Civil Code with particular focus on the
extent to which the concepts of Article 9 have been incorporated into
it.
II. THE RAISON D'ftTRE OF THE PPSAs
The motivation behind significant reform of personal property
security law in Canada was quite different from that which induced
the drafting of Article 9. For many years prior to the enactment of
the first PPSA in Ontario in 1966, the personal property security laws
of common-law provinces provided effective legal devices for both
consumer and business financing. By the beginning of the current
century, most common-law provinces had enacted legislation pro-
viding for the recognition and registration of conditional sales
contracts and chattel mortgages! Canadian provinces did not place
legislative shackles on the equitable mortgages of after-acquired
property as was done in England,2 with the result that this form of
mortgage was used, from an early period, for agricultural and business
financing.3 Under the principle established by the House of Lords in
the pivotal decisions in Holroyd v. Marshall4 and Tailby v. Official
Receiver,5 secured financing on the security of existing and future
accounts of businesses was frequently used in all common-law
provinces prior to enactment of the PPSAs.6
Canadian legislators and judges welcomed and facilitated the use
of the English floating charge. This device, which should not be
confused with the so-called floating lien of Article 9, was never
accepted by American courts. The English floating charge remains
1. The first legislation providing for the registration of chattel mortgages was enacted
in 1849 by the Legislative Assembly of the Province of Canada.
2. See Bills of Sale Act (1878) Amendment Act, 1882, 45 & 46 Vict., ch. 43 (Eng.).
3. Recognition of the validity of chattel mortgages in Canada came through the
courts and not, as in the United States, through legislation.
4. 11 Eng. Rep. 999 (H.L. 1862).
5. 13 App. Cas. 523 (1888) (appeal taken from Eng.).
6. Canadian courts did not have to wrestle with self-created impediments to the
development of this and other forms of secured business financing such as the rulings in
Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353 (1925) and Corn Exch. Bank & Trust Co. v. Klauder, 318
U.S. 434 (1943).
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the principal device for securing business financing in most common-
wealth countries-other than Canada-and countries, such as Israel,
that have retained English common-law legal concepts. The floating
charge is a nonspecific, suspended equitable charge that becomes
specific-crystallizes-only upon default by the debtor or upon the
happening of some other specified event. So long as the charge
remains uncrystallized, the debtor is substantially free to deal with the
charged assets as though they were unencumbered. No attempt has
been made in this Essay to describe all of the intricacies and
peculiarities of this device. It is sufficient to note that the floating
charge is a very flexible and useful corporate financing device.
Clearly Canadians did not need more effective devices for se-
cured financing; what was needed was a more systematic approach to
this area of the law. By the 1960s personal property security law had
become almost Byzantine in its complexity and lack of consistency.
Each financing device had a different conceptual basis and a
regulatory statute designed primarily to impose registration require-
ments as a precondition to secured parties' assertion of a priority
status given by the common law or equity. Registration requirements
were complex and little attempt was made to make them consistent.
The approach contained in Article 9 permitted the flexibility and
scope of extant law in the context of a unified conceptual and
legislative structure. All devices could be regulated through one
regime. Not only did this dramatically simplify the law but, in addi-
tion, it permitted the use of computer technology in a new, single
registry system for all security devices.
The situation in Quebec, while not fundamentally different in
result from the rest of Canada, was in greater need of conceptual
reform because of the contradictory features of Quebec commercial
law: the refusal to recognize the possibility of a hypothece of
movables, on the one hand and, on the other, the urgent need for
security devices to facilitate nonpossessory business asset financing.
While the civil law of Quebec, like that of many other jurisdictions
with civil-law backgrounds, refused to recognize the concept of a
nonpossessory security interest in movable property, it recognized a
variety of title transactions-for example, a conditional sales contract
or a financial lease and sale with a right of redemption-by which
sellers could gain priority.
7. For a definition of "hypothec," see infra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
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In addition, a range of devices and techniques for secured
financing-favoring specific types of creditors or debtors-developed
on the periphery or outside of the Civil Code. Some of the most
important of these devices were commercial pledges, trust deeds,
assignments of commercial accounts, and transfers of inventory to
creditors under the fiction of a negotiable document of title.
Commercial pledges without dispossession were available to secured
loans where commercial equipment was taken as collateral. Trust
deeds, a statutory equivalent of the floating charge, were used to
charge the present and future property of an incorporated debtor or
a limited partnership. Assignments of commerical accounts and
"transfers" of inventory to creditors under the fiction of negotiable
documents of title were also available as secured financing devices.
Again Article 9 provided an approach for the drafters of the Civil
Code through which much of the patchwork of security devices with
their anomalies and inadequacies could be eliminated and replaced
with a much more coherent system for the regulations of secured
financing. However, while Article 9 provided a legislative pattern for
common-law jurisdictions, it could only provide an approach for
Quebec. Legislators in that province were not prepared to be seen as
abandoning civil-law concepts and terminology. What was attempted
was the creation of civil-law parallels to the central features of the
PPSAs and Article 9.
III. THE PROCESS OF REFORM IN CANADA
Not only were the reasons for reform of personal property
security law different in Canada from those in the United States, but
the process of reform has been very different. Notwithstanding initial
attempts, made principally through the efforts of the Canadian Bar
Association,' to get a uniform approach to reform among the
common-law provinces, a leapfrog approach developed. Until the late
1980s the prevailing pattern was for one province to enact a PPSA
8. In 1964 the Canadian Bar Association established a committee to prepare a model
PPSA to serve as the basis for reform of personal property security law throughout the
country. The committee published the Uniform Personal Property Security Act in 1969.
The weaknesses in the 1967 Ontario Act and the 1969 Uniform Act, along with the very
substantial xevisions of Article 9 that were made in 1972, induced the committee to work
on a second draft of the Uniform Act which was completed in 1972. A modified version
of this model was adopted by the Canadian Bar Association and the Uniform Law
Conference in 1974.
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and for another province thereafter to enact its own version contain-
ing new features and, sometimes, different public policy approaches.9
This approach, while not conducive to uniformity, was not with-
out merit. During this period of development, computer technology
was advancing at a very rapid rate and the weaknesses of Article 9
and other earlier models were being revealed through a growing body
of case law. Consequently, each successive version of the PPSA was
an improvement over its predecessor since it accommodated the most
recent developments. This approach, for the most part, came to an
end in the late 1980s after representatives from several western
Canadian provinces decided to develop a model law that would be
used as the basis of new Acts in each of these provinces. In 1984 the
Western Canada Personal Property Security Act Committee-later
renamed the Canadian Conference on Personal Property Security Law
(Canadian Conference)-was formed. The committee's goal, which
was quickly and largely realized, was to develop a model for adoption
by jurisdictions in western Canada. The model prepared by the
committee provided the basis for the British Columbia, 0 Alberta,"
Saskatchewan, 2 Manitoba, 3 New Brunswick,' and Northwest
9. The first PPSA was enacted in Ontario in 1966; however, the system established
by the legislation was not fully operational until 1976. Manitoba followed in 1973,
effective 1981, with a PPSA based substantially on the 1969 Canadian Bar Uniform Act.
The Saskatchewan Law Reform Commission published a report in 1971 proposing a
Personal Property Security Act for Saskatchewan based in part on the Uniform Act, but
containing a number of significant new features. The Saskatchewan Legislature responded
by enacting a PPSA in 1980. In 1989 Ontario enacted a new Act, R.S.O., ch. P-10 (1990)
(Can.), which incorporated some of the innovations contained in the Saskatchewan Act
and a 1974 Uniform Act sponsored by the Canadian Bar Association and the Uniform
Law Conference.
10. Personal Property Security Act, S.B.C., ch. 36 (1989) (Can.), as amended. For a
detailed analysis of this Act, see RONALD C.C. CUMING & RODERICK J. WOOD, BRITISH
COLUMBIA PERSONAL PROPERTY SECURITY ACT HANDBOOK (1993).
11. Personal Property Security Act, R.S.A., ch. P-4.05 (1995) (Can.). For a detailed
analysis of this Act, see RONALD C.C. CUMiNG & RODERICK J. WOOD, ALBERTA
PERSONAL PROPERTY SECURITY ACT HANDBOOK (1993).
12. Personal Property Security Act, S.S., ch. P-6.2 (1993) (Can.). For a detailed
analysis of this Act, see RONALD C.C. CUMING & RODERICK J. WOOD, SASKATCHEWAN
AND MANITOBA PERSONAL PROPERTY SECURITY AcTs HANDBOOK (1994).
13. Personal Property Security and Consequential Amendments Act, S.M., ch. 14
(1993) (Can.) (not yet in force).
14. Personal Property Security Act, S.N.B., ch. 36 (1993) (Can.). New Brunswick is
located in Atlantic Canada. However, this province decided to adopt the Canadian
Conference model since it was thought to be more advanced than the 1989 Ontario Act
or any of the earlier models.
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Territories 5 Acts. The process of conversion to modem systems of
personal property law has not been completed in Canada. Two
PPSAs have yet to be proclaimed in force. An additional three
provinces-Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, and Newfound-
land-have yet to enact PPSAs.
Pan-Canadian uniformity of personal property security law is not
likely to be realized for a long period of time. While there is a
substantial degree of similarity in substantive law and among the
registry systems of the jurisdictions that enacted the Canadian Confer-
ence model, there remain important interjurisdictional differences. Of
particular concern is that the Ontario Act and registry system depart
significantly from their counterparts in most other PPSA provinces.
Although it is safe to predict that all common-law jurisdictions will
ultimately enact some form of a PPSA-most likely the model
prepared by the Canadian Conference-there is very little likelihood
that anything more than elementary harmonization between Quebec
secured financing law and that of the other provinces and territories
will be achieved in the foreseeable future.
IV. A FEDERAL SYSTEM
The law dealing with the regulation of secured financing in
Canada, like most other features of the Canadian legal and constitu-
tional structures, is complex. Legislative jurisdiction over secured
financing transactions is divided between the federal Parliament and
the provincial legislatures. Bank financing may fall under provincial
or federal regulation depending upon the type of transaction involved.
All other secured financiers are subject to provincial law except to the
very limited extent that bankruptcy law is involved.
The chartered banks play a very dominant role in Canadian
business and consumer financing. Banks are very large, with
hundreds of branches throughout the country, and they control a
much greater share of the secured financing market than their
counterparts in the United States. Traditionally, the banking industry
has been very oligopolistic with the result that it has had considerable
influence over the federal government policies and legislation in the
area of secured financing and bankruptcy.
15. Personal Property Security Act, S.N.W.T., ch. 8 (1994) (Can.) (not yet in force).
[Vol. 29:971
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The Bank Act 16 provides a sui generis statutory regime-avail-
able only to banks-applicable to secured loans made by banks to
business enterprises and agricultural producers. 7 While on the
surface the system appears very archaic, in fact it contains many of
the features of a modem system for security interests in personal
property. It provides for notice filing"8 rather than document filing,
with the result that a single notice can relate to any number of
different agreements between the parties. It permits tacking of future
advances 9 and automatic attachment of a security in after-acquired
property of the debtor."° However, it is not without deficiencies. It
does not permit security for antecedent debt or the use of intangible
property as collateral2' nor does it generally provide for security in
proceeds?2
Banks are not confined to the system of the Bank Act; they can
elect to lend under security agreements regulated by provincial law.
Indeed, there is some judicial support for the view that a Bank Act
security agreement is also a PPSA agreemente and that a bank can
validly hold overlapping Bank Act and PPSA security agreements
covering the same collateral and securing the same debt.24
There is general recognition of the need to modernize the system
contained in the Bank Act. However, initial steps in this direction
were totally misdirected and set back the reform process.' Revision
16. S.C., ch. 46 (1991) (Can.).
17. Id. §§ 425-432.
18. Id. § 427(4).
19. See Royal Bank of Can. v. Bank of Montreal [1976] 4 W.W.R. 721 (Sask.).
20. Bank Act § 427(2).
21. See id. §§ 427(1), 429(1).
22. See id. § 428(12). See generally Ronald C.C. Cuming & Roderick J. Wood,
Compatibility of Federal and Provincial Personal Property Security Law, 65 CAN. B. REV.
267, 296-301 (1986).
23. Bank of N.S. v. International Harvester Credit Corp., 74 O.R.2d 738, 743-44
(1990); Bank of Montreal v. Pulsar Ventures Inc., 58 Sask. R. 224, 229-30 (1988). This is
no longer possible under the PPSAs of most prpvinces-not including Ontario-which
exclude Bank Act security agreements from the scope of the legislation. See, eg., Personal
Property Security Act, S.B.C., ch. 36, § 4(b) (1989) (Can.).
24. Bank of N.S., 74 O.R.2d at 743-44; see Ronald C.C. Cuming, PPSA-Section 178
Bank Act Overlap: No Closer to Solutions, 18 CAN. Bus. L.. 135 (1991). This is no
longer possible under Saskatchewan law which treats as void any security interest held by
a bank which has a Bank Act security interest in the same collateral, given by the same
debtor. See Personal Property Security Act, S.S., ch, P-6.2, § 9(4) (1993) (Can.).
25. See Ronald C.C. Cuming, The Position Paper on Revised Bank Act Security:
Rehabilitation of Canadian Personal Property Security Law or Curing the Illness by Killing
the Patient, 20 CAN. Bus. LJ. 336 (1992).
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of the Bank Act so as to bring it conceptually and administratively in
line with the provincial PPSAs cannot be expected until the Canadian
banking industry is prepared to put the necessary pressure on Par-
liament.
V. SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE PPSAs AND
UCC ARTICLE 9
The similarities between a Canadian PPSA and Article 9 are
much more numerous than the differences. A PPSA is structurally
very similar to Article 9: The same technical terminology-such as
attach, perfect, and financing statement-has been used and the
sequence in which matters are addressed is very close to that used in
the drafting of Article 9. However, significant differences do exist.
The short length of this Essay precludes the possibility of doing more
than pointing to a few of them. As noted above, not all PPSAs are
the same. For the purposes of this Essay, the 1993 Saskatchewan
Personal Property Security Act' (Act) has been used in the compar-
ison. This Act is based on the model prepared by the Canadian
Conference and, as such, is representative of personal property
security legislation in four other provinces27 and one territory.2
A. Scope
The Act has roughly the same scope as Article 9 with the
important exception that the conflict of laws, perfection, and priority
provisions-but not inter partes enforcement provisions-apply to
chattel leases for a term of more than one year29 and commercial
consignments." The result is that most long-term leases and
nonconsumer consignments, whether or not they secure payment or
performance of an obligation, fall within the regulatory regime of the
Act. In addition, the legislation applies to deposit accounts and treats
them as any other account.31
26. S.S., ch. P-6.2 (1993) (Can.).
27. Alberta, British Columbia, Manitoba (not yet in force), and New Brunswick.
28. Northwest Territories (not yet in force).
29. Personal Property Security Act, S.S., ch. P-6.2, § 2(1)(y) (1993) (Can.).
30. Id. § 2(1)(h).
31. The concept of "account" is broader under the Act than under Article 9; any
present or future monetary obligation can be an account so long as it is not represented
by an instrument, security, or chattel paper. Id § 2(1)(b). A byproduct of this approach
is that, unlike Article 9, the Act applies to sales of loan obligations.
[Vol. 29:971
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-B. Conflict of Laws Rules
The Act's conflict of laws rules are similar to the pre-1972 Article
9 provisions since the 1972 changes to Article 9 conflict of laws rules
were not attractive to Canadian law reformers. Validity and perfec-
tion of a security interest in nonmobile goods, and possessory security
interests in other types of collateral-other than pure intangibles-are
governed by the lex situs of the. collateral at the date the security
interest attaches." The "grace period"-the period of temporary
perfection-for compliance with the registration requirements of a
jurisdiction into which goods are removed is sixty days or fifteen days
from the date the secured party learns of the removal, whichever is
less.3 However, good faith buyers are not affected by grace periods
or any other period of temporary perfection under the Act. 4 It is
a consistent policy of the Act that buyers are not affected by
temporary perfection periods and, as a result, are entitled to rely on
information-or lack of it-in the registry. This feature is very
important in Canada since no jurisdiction has a certificate of title
system for motor vehicles or other high-value goods. It is generally
accepted in most provinces which have PPSAs that buyers will obtain
a search result from the Personal Property Registry before paying the
purchase price and should be able to rely on the information disclosed
when assessing the legal risk associated with the purchase.35
The validity and perfection of a security interest in mobile goods
and intangibles are determined by the law of the debtor's location at
the time of attachment except where such law does not provide for
the registration of security interests.3 6 In such a case, the security
interest is subordinate to an interest in an account payable in the
province or an interest in tangible property-including instruments,
securities, money, or chattel paper-acquired in the province. 7 The
effect of this provision is to ensure that persons acquiring interests in
personal property will have either priority or access to a public
registry through which competing security interests are discoverable.
32. Id § 5(1).
33. It § 5(3).
34. Id; id. § 30(5).
35. In Ontario sellers of used cars are legally required to provide the buyer with a
search result issued by the Personal Property Registry.
36. Personal Property Security Act, S.S., ch. P-6.2, § 7 (1993) (Can.).
37. Idt § 7(4).
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C. Perfection
Unlike Article 9, the Act provides for perfection by possession,
but not by seizure, of tangible collateral.38 It also provides for
perfection by registration of security interests in all types of collateral,
including money and negotiable securities.39 A financing statement,
either written or electronic,4° may be registered before an agreement
is executed and may relate to any number of separate security
agreements between the parties.4' A financing statement is not
signed by the debtor, but the Act contains an elaborate system
protecting against unauthorized registrations.' This system applies
as well to situations where the secured party has overdescribed the
collateral in the registration or where the obligation secured has been
discharged, but a registration against the name or property of the
debtor remains in the registry. Under this system, the secured party
must give to the debtor a copy of the financing statement, if in written
form, or a copy of the verification statement issued by the registry
upon registration of a financing statement.43 A person named as
debtor in a-registration or a person with an interest in the property
described as collateral in the financing statement can demand that the
secured party amend or discharge-as is appropriate under the
circumstances-the registration within fifteen days from the date of
delivery of the demand. If the secured party fails to respond to the
demand, the person making the demand may register a financing
change statement-upon proof to the registrar that the demand was
delivered-amending or discharging the registration. If a secured
party has a right to have the registration maintained, it must make
application to a court for an order maintaining the registration.
Failure to respond to the demand when legally required to do so
results in a "deemed damages" penalty in the amount of $200"
38. Id § 24.
39. Id § 25.
40. All of the remote-access systems except that of New Brunswick permit the use of
hard copy financing statements and search requests. The New Brunswick system is totally
electronic with the result that paper is eliminated.
41. Personal Property Security Act, S.S., ch. P-6.2, § 43(4)-(5) (1993) (Can.).
42. Id § 50.
43. Id § 43(12). For a brief description of the role of the verification statement, see
infra text accompanying note 51.
44. The Personal Property Security Act Regulations, R.R.S., ch. P-6.2, Reg. 1, § 33
(1995) (Can.).
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payable to the person making the demand a' By the same token, the
Act imposes a $200 deemed damages penalty payable to the secured
party where an unjustified demand is made.
46
When registering a financing statement, the registering party can
choose the period of registration between one and twenty-five years
or the party can choose infinity registration. The registration fees in
Saskatchewan are five dollars per year or $400 for infinity registration.
Long before PPSAs were adopted in Canada, it was recognized
that a system that uses only the name of the debtor as the registra-
tion-search criterion has a fundamental weakness. Such a system
works well where the collateral is present or future inventory or
accounts. It works less well, however, where the collateral is a
specific item that is easily identifiable. The problem with a debtor
name registration-search system is that it does not give protection to
a searching party who is not in the position to obtain a search of the
registry based on the debtor's name because the existence or identity
of the debtor is unknown to the searching party. If a unique
identifier, such as the serial number of the machine, is available as a
search criterion, a remote party will get the protection of the registry
system.
The need for a system which offers collateral description registra-
tion-search criteria is particularly acute where collateral is property
for which there is an active resale market. Motor vehicles are the
most important items of collateral falling within this category. Since
no province in Canada has enacted a certificate of title system for
goods which provides for the issue of paper titles, it was necessary for
Canadian legislators to address the problem of remote party protec-
tion through the use of collateral description registration-search
criteria. Regulations to the Act provide that, where the collateral is
a motor vehicle,47 boat, aircraft, or trailer held as consumer goods,
45. Personal Property Security Act, S.S., ch. P-6.2, § 65(6) (1993) (Can.).
46. 111 § 65(7).
47. The regulations broady define the term:
(o) "motor vehicle" means a mobile device that is propelled primarily by any
power other than muscle power:
(i) in, on or by which a person or thing may be transported or drawn, and
that is designed for use on a road or on natural terrain; or
(ii) that is used in the construction or maintenance of roads;
and includes a pedal bicycle with motor attached, a combine and a tractor, but
does not include a device that runs on rails or machinery designed only for use
in farming other than a combine or tractor.
Personal Property Security Act, S.S., ch. P-6.2, § 2(1)(o) (1993) (Can.).
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the collateral must be described by serial number. For motor vehicles
this is the vehicle identification number provided by the manufacturer.
For boats and aircraft48 it is the Ministry of Transport designation.49
When these types of collateral are held as equipment, a generic
description may be used, but such a description provides protection
only against the trustee in bankruptcy and execution creditors.' If
full protection is sought, the serial number must be provided. When
the collateral is held by the debtor as inventory, there is no require-
ment that specific items of collateral be described on the financing
statement.
Perhaps the most innovative feature of Canadian developments
in this area of personal property security law reform is the computer-
ization of personal property registries. All registrations are effected
at a single central registry within the province. The registry is
accessible for both registering financing statements and searching for
registrations through remote computer terminals-simple personal
computer equipment and a modem-which can be located anywhere.
Indeed, registrations and searches can be effected by remote compu-
ter access from any place in the world where long distance telephone
communication to the registries is available. Currently, large Toronto
law firms conduct searches of and register financing statements in the
British Columbia registry 3000 kilometers away. However, users of
remote communication facilities must make prior arrangements for
payment of registration and search fees. Casual users of the system
can obtain access through a private service provider that has an
account with the registry, through a regional government office that
offers the service, or through the use of a telephone or facsimile
machine.
When a registration is effected in the registry, the computer
automatically prints out a verification statement containing the
information that has been entered into the database relating to that
registration. The statement is immediately sent to the registering
party. A verification statement has two principal functions. It
provides a fail-safe measure permitting a registering party to deter-
48. There is no federal registry for security interests in aircraft with the result that
Canada is not a party to the 1948 Geneva Convention on the International Recognition
of Rights in Aircraft.
49. The Personal Property Security Act Regulations, R.R.S., ch. P-6.2, Reg. 1,
§ 13(1)(b) (1995) (Can.).
50. Personal Property Security Act, S.S., ch. P-6.2, §§ 30(5)-(6), 35(4) (1993) (Can.).
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mine whether or not the information contained in the database of the
registry relating to its registration is accurate. Errors on the part of
the registering party can be immediately identified and corrected. In
addition, verification statements are part of a scheme to encourage
early discharge of unnecessary registrations. The verification
statement has a second page that contains the registered information.
When a secured party wishes to discharge a registration, all it needs
to do is send the discharge verification form to the registry. No
clerical costs are incurred in preparing the discharge and no fee for
discharge of the registration is charged by the registry. A discharge
verification statement is sent to the registering and secured party
when a registration is discharged. This measure is designed to reduce
the effect of fraudulent discharges. Inadvertently or fraudulently
discharged registrations or lapsed registrations can be reinstated
within thirty days of discharge or lapse without loss of priority status
vis-4-vis anyone other than the holder of an intervening interest.5'
Canadian experience has revealed the important differences
between a computerized registry and a manually operated registry. A
primary source of these differences is the fact that the actual
searching in a computerized registry is done electronically with the
result that ad hoc application of human discretion and judgment is not
possible. It is a fundamental rule of computer technology that close
is not good enough. In other words, as a general rule, the criteria for
registration must be the same criteria for searching. To take a simple
example: If the debtor's name is registered as John P Smith, but the
correct name, which is used by a third party as a search criterion, is
John P Smyth, the registration and search criteria do not match and,
unless special features are built into the computer program of the
registry, disclosure of the registration will not result. If no disclosure
occurs, the question arises as to legal sufficiency of the registration.
A simplistic approach is to conclude that, since the debtor's name was
not correctly registered, the registration is invalid. However, this
approach is commercially and politically unacceptable. The conse-
quences associated with invalid registrations can be significant in
commercial terms. As a practical matter, errors in recording debtors'
names or the serial numbers of goods collateral cannot be eliminated.
Refusal or failure to accommodate these realities will result in public
rejection of computerized registries. The drafters of the PPSAs and
51. Id § 35(7).
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the designers of the computer programs for the Canadian personal
property registries were quite aware of these realities. As a result
they attempted to design systems that, given the profile of the users
of the systems, accommodate a level of human error that can
reasonably be expected.
The Act provides that the validity of a registration is not affected
by a defect, omission, or error unless the defect, omission, or error
results in the registration being "seriously misleading."52  Clearly,
strict compliance with registration requirements is not a prerequisite
to the validity of a registration. The test of validity contained in the
Act is necessarily an objective one. Application of it involves the
determination as to whether or not a reasonable person who obtains
a search result using the correct name of the debtor, or the correct
serial number of the collateral, would be misled by an error on the
part of the registering party in recording on the financing statement
the debtor's name or the serial number of the collateral. Of course,
if the computer program of the registry system were to demand
perfect compliance on the part of a registering party, a reasonable
person would be misled because the registration would not be dis-
closed when the debtor's name or serial number of the collateral is
used as the search criterion. However, if, as is the case in most
provinces, a search using one or other of these criteria reveals one or
more registrations that are "close similar matches" to the search
criterion used, it is a matter to determine in each case whether a
reasonable person who obtains the search result disclosing the
registration in the list as a close similar match would be seriously
misled by the differences between the information in the disclosed
registration and the search criterion used by the searcher.
D. Enforcement
There are two significant differences between the enforcement
provisions of the Act and their counterparts in Article 9. One of
these is the extent of statutory prescription of default right remedies
and the other is recognition of the use of document-appointed
receivers.
Canadian legislators were not as convinced as were the drafters
of Article 9 that the need for balance between the interests of the
secured party and the debtor could best be addressed by application
52. IL § 43(6).
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of a general standard of commercial reasonableness without more
detailed guidance as to what is legally required. Consequently, Cana-
dian legislation provides detailed rules regulating enforcement of
security interests. However, the Act gives a court broad discretionary
power of relief from compliance with these rules and power to give
directions or issue orders affecting the rights of secured parties and
debtors. 3 Debtors are given extensive rights of redemption and
reinstatement, thereby avoiding the effects of acceleration clauses.54
Noncompliance by a secured party does not result in automatic loss
of the right to a deficiency but can result in deemed damages and give
rise to an onus on the secured party to prove that the noncompliance
did not result in full realization of the value of the property or did not
interfere with the debtor's right to redeem or reinstate.55
A feature of Canadian personal property security law not found
in the United States is the extensive use of privately-appointed recei-
vers. The Act provides that the parties may include in the security
agreement the power to appoint a receiver or receiver-manager in the
event of default. 6 Generally, a receiver-manager has the power to
take control of the business-a receivership is used principally in cases
where the secured party has a broadly-based security interest-and
run it57 or liquidate it either as an ongoing concern or on a piece-by-
piece basis. All aspects of a receiver's or receiver-manager's activities
are subject to the same standard of commercial reasonableness that
are applicable to the secured party appointing the receiver or
receiver-manager. In addition, receivers or receiver-managers are
subject to the scrutiny of the court. This scrutiny can be invoked in
a summary manner by the debtor or by other persons who have inter-
ests in the collateral.58 In addition, receivers or receiver-managers
are obligated to provide information concerning the conduct of the
receivership to such persons. 9
53. Id § 63(2).
54. Id § 62.
55. IdL § 65.
56. Canadian insolvency law is not as readily available in cases of business insolvency
as is Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code in comparable situations in the
United States.
57. Receivers with this power are referred to as "receiver-managers." Almost all
security agreements providing for receivership give management powers to an appointed
receiver.
58. Personal Property Security Act, S.S., ch. P-6.2, § 64(8) (1993) (Can.).
59. Id § 64(4)-(7).
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VI. THE QUEBEC CIVIL CODE-BOOK SIX, TITLE THREE
The hypothec of the Civil Code' is the conceptual and function-
al equivalent of the security interest of the PPSAs and Article 9. A
hypothec is a "real right" and a charge on either corporeal or
incorporeal property, whether movable or immovable, that secures
debt obligations. It confers on the creditor the right to follow the
property charged into the hands of transferees, to take possession of
it, to take it in payment or to sell it, or cause it to be sold and to have
a preference on the proceeds of the sale. 1
The hypothec displaces most, but not all, other types of financing
devices used in Quebec prior to the implementation of the 1991 Civil
Code-the hypothec provisions of which came into force on January
1, 1994. Its drafters refused to follow Article 9 and the PPSAs when
it came to recharacterizing leases and title retention sales contracts. as
security devices. These transactions remain separate and are subject
to regimes that prescribe different legal relationships between the
parties than those applicable to transactions that create hypothecs.
For example, the seller bf movables under a title retention agreement
must elect between taking back the movables or bringing an action
against the buyer for the balance of the purchase price. 2 A vendor
who has financed the purchase of movables under a hypothec
arrangement can have the movables sold without losing the right to
recover the balance owed by the buyer.' Similar rigidity is applied
to leasing arrangements. The Civil Code treats operating leases and
financing leases separately from hypothecs,' and there appears to be
no basis on which a Quebec court could conclude that a lease of the
kind that would be characterized as a security agreement under
Article 9 or as a hypothec under the PPSAs.
A hypothec can charge future property and automatically extends
to property acquired by the debtor as replacement for charged
property sold in the ordinary course of business.' The Civil Code
recognizes what it terms a "hypothec on a universality," which is a
60. QUEBEC CIVIL CODE [QUE. CIv: C.] arts. 2660-2802 (Can.).
61. Id. arts. 2660, 2666, 2667.
62. Id. arts. 1745-1749. However, a sale with a right to redeem which is used to secure
a loan is treated as creating a hypothec. Id. art. 1756.
63. Id. arts. 2784-2790 (applicable to a hypothec on the property of an enterprise).
64. Id. arts. 1842-1891.
65. Id. arts. 2666, 2670, 2673-2675, 2677, 2684.
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charge on all property of a specified kind or kinds.6 In addition,
and somewhat anomalously, it perpetuates the pre-reform Quebec
version of the English floating charge which is referred to as a
"floating hypothec."'67 Given the rather weak position that the
creditor acquires under this form of hypothec, it is most unlikely that
it will be frequently used., Most of the security rights of the creditor
are suspended until the charge is crystallized. Priority, except as
against another floating charge, dates from the registration of a notice
of crystallization.68
Where the creditor has a hypothec on a universality and no
replacement property is acquired by the debtor, the hypothec extends
to the proceeds of the alienated property so long as they can be
identified.69 However, there is no definition of "proceeds" in the
Civil Code and Quebec law does not have an equivalent to the equity
rules of tracing;10 thus, it is difficult to see how this feature can be
effective in situations where a direct transactional link cannot be
established between the charged property and property claimed as
proceeds.
The priority structure of the Code is similar in function to that of
the PPSAs and Article 9. It provides for a first-to-register or -publish
priority rule;7' however, unlike its counterparts elsewhere in North
America, the Civil Code does not permit preagreement publication.
It does, however, permit publication before the debtor acquires
ownership in the property charged.72 The Civil Code provides for a
special priority status for vendors' hypothecs equivalent to that of a
purchase money security interest under the PPSAs and Article 9;73
however, this status does not extend to lenders who provide purchase
money financing and take a hypothec on the property purchased with
66. Id.
67. Id. arts. 2715-2723. None of the common-law jurisdictions that have enacted
PPSAs have retained anything that approximates conceptually the floating charge. All
PPSAs provide that a security interest can be taken in all of a debtor's present and after-
acquired personal property, but this results in a fixed charge, not a nonspecific charge.
68. Id. arts. 2716, 2755, 2955.
69. Id. art. 2674.
70. Courts in common-law provinces have taken equity tracing rules and modified
them to reflect the policies of the PPSAs. See Ronald C.C. Cuming, Protecting Interests
in Proceeds: Equity and Canadian Personal Property Security Acts, in EQUrrY,
FIDUCIARIES AND TRusTs 423 (Donovan W.M. Waters ed., 1993).
71. QuE. Civ. C. arts. 2941, 2945.
72. Id. arts. 2950, 2954.
73. Id. art. 2954.
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the loans. A hypothec may be granted to secure any obligation, even
though the debtor has not received the value in consideration of
which the debtor has undertaken the obligation." Further, a
hypothec is not necessarily extinguished because the debtor has paid
down a line of credit to zero. However, the amount secured by the
hypothec must be specified in the agreement providing for it.75
The Civil Code provides an elaborate enforcement regime. A
preseizure notice is generally required 76 and full redemption rights
are given to debtors.77 A creditor who has seized hypothecated
property of a business enterprise may proceed to sell it. A set of
regulatory rules is prescribed in order to ensure that the interests of
the debtor are protected." The creditor can elect to take the
property in payment of the debt. 9 However, there are limitations
on this right designed to protect the interests of the debtor and
subordinate hypothecatory creditors.0
A rough equivalent of common-law receivership is contained in
the Civil Code. "A creditor who holds a hypothec on the property of
an enterprise may ... take possession" 1 and administer it or may
delegate the power of administration to someone else. Administra-
tion is subject to rules prescribed by the Civil Code for the regulation
of administrators of property of others.'
The private international law rules of the Civil Code applicable
to hypothecs roughly parallel those of the PPSAs. The validity,
publication, and effects of publication of a movable security are
governed by the lex situs at the date of creation of the movable.'
Property subject to a published security that is brought into Quebec
is deemed to be published in Quebec if it is actually published in the
province before the earliest of (1) thirty days from the date the
property reaches Quebec, (2) fifteen days from the date the creditor
is advised that the property has arrived in Quebec, or (3) the
cessation of the effect of publication in the jurisdiction where the
74. Id. arts. 2687-2688.
75. Id. arts. 2689-2690.
76. Id. arts. 2749, 2757-2759.
77. Id. art. 2761.
78. Id. arts. 2784-2788.
79. Id. arts. 2778, 2781-2783.
80. Id. arts. 2779-2780.
81. Id. art. 2773.
82. Id. arts. 2773-2774.
83. Id. art. 3102.
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property was situated at the time of creation of the security. 4 How-
ever, a security that is deemed to be registered in Quebec may not be
set up against a buyer who has acquired the property in the ordinary
course of the activities of the grantor of the security." The validity
of a security charged on a corporeal movable-other than a docu-
ment-based security-ordinarily used in more than one jurisdiction or
charged on an incorporeal movable is governed by the law of the
domicile of the debtor at the date of creation of the security.86
Domiciliary law also governs publication and effect of publication.'
A change of domicile by the debtor requires publication of the
security in the new domicile, but only if it is within Quebec.88
VII. SUMMARY
The genius of Article 9 lies in the fact that it reflects the needs
of modern business financing and, as such, its basic concepts are
universal. This universality was early recognized in common-law
provinces of Canada and more recently in Quebec. It would be
unreasonable to expect that every aspect of Article 9 will find
acceptance in jurisdictions that have legal traditions and public policy
choices that differ from those of the United States. Nor could it be
expected that registry concepts and related structures that were
current in the 1950s would be given much consideration by Canadian
law reformers of the 1980s and 1990s. However, given the clearly
established trends in the reform of personal property security law in
Canadian jurisdictions, the already considerable level of harmoniza-
tion between the substantive secured financing laws of the individual
states of the United States and the provinces of Canada can be
expected to be augmented in the immediate future.
84. Id. art. 3104.
85. Id.
86. Id. art. 3105.
87. Id.
88. Id. art. 3106.
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